

Effective CubeSat Fault Management Strategies Beyond Low Earth Orbit

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Outline

- BioSentinel Mission Overview
- Fault Management Approach
- Propulsion Fault Management Example
- Future Work



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The BioSentinel Mission



BioSentinel: A Deep Space CubeSat




Figure 1. The BioSentinel spacecraft,
shown with solar panels deployed

- A 6U CubeSat that will launch on the first flight of the Space Launch System (EM-1)
- Will operate in an Earth-trailing, heliocentric orbit
- Requires active attitude determination and control and a propulsion system to support nominal operations
- Science payload will study the effects of deep space radiation on a colony of yeast cells (eukaryotic—good analogy for humans)



Valuable Access to Deep Space

- BioSentinel will characterize radiation environment for future human exploration of deep space
- Deduced by observing behavior of yeast cells in the presence of high-energy particle strikes
- Launch on EM-1 provides access to environment beyond the Earth's magnetosphere
- Linear Energy Transfer (LET) sensor will provide complementary radiation data




Figure 2. One half of the BioSensor payload, which will study the impact of radiation on DNA.



Fault Management Considerations

- Thermal sensitivity of biology payload is of greatest concern when ensuring top-level mission success
- BioSentinel will have at most 3 communications passes of roughly 30 minutes with the Deep Space Network per day
- Data rates are such that very few faults will be actionable from the ground (and never in real-time)
- Fault management software must be able to detect off-nominal behaviors and intercede without direction interaction with Mission Operations System (MOS)



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Fault Management Approach

Mission Phases and Mode Transitions




Figure 3. Spacecraft operating modes and their allowed transitions over all phases of the BioSentinel Mission



Possible On-Board Responses

- No response
 - Failure modes for which no response will be taken are tracked as risks at the Project level
- Record telemetry for MOS
 - Managed through strike counters and event messages
- Flight software action
 - Limit checkers, memory scrubs, etc.
- Flight hardware action
 - Autonomous hardware actions, such as entering into Safe Mode



Watch Points/Action Points Detail

- Each subsystem identifies telemetry points that should be monitored by the limit checker
- Unique watch points (i.e. reaction wheel rate limit) are assigned specific strike counts that are also monitored by the limit checker
- When a specific watch point exceeds its strike count it can trigger an action point (such as transitioning to safe mode)
 - Those action points can be reset autonomously or manually via MOS
- Multiple telemetry points can be combined into a specific watch point, depending on the needs of the subsystem



Additional Flight Software Actions

- Strike counters associated with all subsystem telemetry watch points will be recorded and sent to MOS as part of standard telemetry
- Event messages can be generated by flight software at higher frequency than standard telemetry
 - Specific event messages will be designed for specific fault scenarios
- Flight software limit checker will constantly monitor all watch points, and if necessary an associated action point will trigger a relative time sequence (RTS) script
- Due to communications challenges resulting from deep space operations limit checker is first/best line of defense




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Fault Management Example



Propulsion System Thermal Limit (1/2)



- The cold gas propulsion system being used for BioSentinel has a nominal upper-bound on operating temperature of 50 °C
- Temperature and pressure sensors are located inside both the main tank and the expansion tank
- Watch point/actions points are designed to ignore individual out-of-bounds measurements, while protecting against an overheating condition



Propulsion System Thermal Limit (2/2)

- Watch point: All propulsion system temperatures and pressures
- Action point: If any individual sensor is out of range 10 times in a row (10 seconds), reboot the propulsion system
- Watch point: Main tank pressure AND main tank temperature
- Action point: If both main tank pressure and main tank temperature are out of range 12 times in a row, vent the plenum to reduce pressure in the main tank



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Future Work

- Further development of the watch points and action points for all subsystems
- Refinement of downlink budgets for each subsystem for commissioning and nominal operating phases
- Continued development/testing of limit checker autonomy
- Even more testing



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Questions?

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